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Several theories have been proposed to account for variation in the intensity of life
regrets. Variables hypothesized to affect the intensity of regret include: whether the
regretted decision was an action or an inaction, the degree to which the decision was
justified, and the life domain of the regret. No previous study has compared the effects
of these key predictors in a single model in order to identify which are most strongly
associated with the intensity of life regret. In this study, respondents (N = 500) to a
postal survey answered questions concerning the nature of their greatest life regret.
A Bayesian regression analysis suggested that regret intensity was greater for—in order
of importance—decisions that breached participants’ personal life rules, decisions in
social life domains than non-social domains, and decisions that lacked an explicit
justification. Although regrets of inaction were more frequent than regrets of action,
regrets relating to actions were slightly more intense.
Keywords: regret, justification, inaction, action, Bayesian
INTRODUCTION
Our ability to make decisions that in retrospect appear breathtakingly misguided is a trait spanning
social and cultural divides, and crossing gender and age barriers. For example, despite protests
from wise counsel, Priam chose to open the gates of Troy to the gift of a large wooden horse. The
president of the Western Union Telegraph Company decided to forgo Alexander Graham Bell’s
offer of the patent rights on the “telephone” which he considered an expensive “electrical toy.” After
sitting through a live hour-long audition, Decca Record executives decided not to offer a contract
to a young quartet called “The Beatles.” Each of these decisions no doubt resulted in an important
emotional response: regret. Regret is very common (Shimanoff, 1984; Landman, 1987), and is felt
when the outcome of a decision is worse than the outcome of an option foregone (Zeelenberg,
1999). Research over the last several decades has produced several competing theories seeking to
predict what makes for the most intense regrets; each theory suggests unique explanations for the
intensity of regret. Despite rising interest in regret research, no study has to date comprehensively
compared the key predictors of regret from competing theories in a single statistical model in order
to ascertain their relative importance in affecting the intensity of our life regrets. This study aims
is to fill this gap by focusing on three distinct theories that have identified competing predictors of
regret.
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Three Theories of Regret
The temporal theory of regret (Gilovich and Medvec, 1994, 1995)
is one of the most well-known regret theories and suggests that
lifespan changes in regret intensity are driven by the nature of
the regrettable decision itself (i.e., whether the regret relates to
an action or an inaction). Specifically, the temporal theory of
regret suggests that “[a]ctions produce greater regret in the short-
term, whereas inactions generate more regret in the long run”
(Gilovich and Medvec, 1994, p. 361). Gilovich and Medvec (1995)
propose a variety of mechanisms that might explain why regret
for inactions might increase over time compared to regret for
actions, including the idea that outcomes resulting from mistaken
actions can be ameliorated by opportunities afforded by the
passage of time, whereas there may not be similar opportunities
to correct the outcomes of regretted inactions.
Another key contemporary theory of regret is decision-
justification theory (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002), which
identifies the underlying decision rationale as key for regret
generation. Similarly to other theories of regret, decision-
justification theory proposes that one key influence on regret is
the outcome of the decision: We feel more regret over decisions
whose outcomes compare poorly to those of options foregone.
However, decision-justification theory suggests furthermore that
the intensity of regret felt also depends on the degree to which
the individual identifies the decision as justifiable: A decision that
results in a poor outcome will cause less regret if the decision was,
in retrospect, still justified.
In contrast to both the temporal theory of regret and
decision-justification theory, a third “belonging” theory of regret
(Morrison et al., 2012) identifies the context of the regrettable
decision as foundational in driving regret intensity. Specifically,
Morrison et al. (2012) found that regrets in domains particularly
relevant to our senses of social belonging (e.g., romantic or family
domains) are more intensely felt than those in less social domains
(e.g., work, education), suggesting that an individual experiences
more regret when a poor decision is perceived to represent a
threat to their sense of social belonging.
In sum, each of these three theories incorporates unique
hypotheses concerning the key predictors of regret intensity; our
study thus seeks to test these hypotheses. In addition, there is
little evidence in the extant literature that the various predictors
of regret specified in these three theories have been compared
with each other in a single statistical model in order to assess
their relative importance in generating regret intensity. Our study
thus seeks to simultaneously assess the effects of these various
predictors of regret intensity (whether a regret relates to an action
or inaction, how justified the original decision was, and whether a
regretted decision was in a social domain), and thereby determine
which are the strongest drivers of regret intensity.
Testing an Extension to
Decision-Justification Theory: Implicit
Justifications
As noted above, one theory tested in this study is Connolly
and Zeelenberg’s (2002) decision-justification theory. Connolly
and Zeelenberg note, however, that little is known regarding
the nature of justification generation. They suggest that one
particularly effective form of justification is the presence of “a
careful, competent decision” (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002,
p. 215)”. However, justifications need not always be rational or
explicit: Research also shows that justifications based on our
implicit personal values or life-rules affect our experience of
regret (Seta et al., 2001; Lönnqvist et al., 2006). This finding
reflects core notions in theories of decision-making—like the
theory of Regulatory Fit (Higgins, 2000; Camacho et al., 2003)—
that maintain that consistency with our implicit values is an
important factor in decision making. It is therefore feasible that
decision justifications present themselves in two forms: explicit
and implicit. To this end it seems likely that explicit axiom-based
justifications, as described by Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002)
shield one from regret, but that decisions lacking an explicit
justification might still incur little regret if they were deemed
consistent with an individual’s values or rules (i.e., a justification
that is implicit in the sense that it stems from the consistency of an
action or inaction with one’s individual life rules). We therefore
hypothesized that regretted decisions that were consistent with
participant’s personal life rules would be less intensely regretted.
A Methodological Issue: Regret Intensity
An important issue with respect to the theories mentioned above
is that while the theories discussed focus on explaining variation
in the intensity of regret, much of the existing empirical research
concerning these theories has actually assessed the frequency
with which reported regrets fall into particular categories—
rather than explicitly measuring regret intensity. For example,
Gilovich and Medvec’s (1994) studies analyzed the frequency
with which participants’ most greatly regretted decisions fell
into particular categories (e.g., action/inaction), rather than
directly measuring or analyzing regret intensity. More recent
studies similarly have often focused on the frequency with which
participants’ regrets fall into particular categories or life domains
(e.g., Roese et al., 2009; Morrison and Roese, 2011; but c.f.
Wilkinson et al., 2015). Emotional frequency and intensity are
distinct processes underlying the experience of affect (Diener
et al., 1985; Schimmack and Diener, 1997) and they are not
necessarily highly correlated: Frequent emotions (e.g., happiness)
may not necessarily be intense, while infrequent emotions (e.g.,
rage) may be very intense. Studies assessing regret frequency as
a proxy for regret intensity are therefore potentially misleading,
and this may explain why the few studies directly distinguishing
regret frequency and intensity found inaction regrets to be more
frequently reported but no more intense than action regrets
(Feldman et al., 1999; Bonnefon and Zhang, 2008). This study
will therefore focus on reported regret intensity (rather than
frequency) in order to provide conclusions as to the key drivers
of regret intensity across the lifespan.
Aims and Predictions
In this study, we seek to test the temporal, decision-justification,
and belonging theories of regret so as to determine which
characteristics associated with a regretted decision are most
strongly associated with the intensity of regret. Predictions
implied by these theories have been tested in the past, but
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each theory has generally been tested in isolation. We also
deliberately focus on studying the intensity of regretted decisions
as opposed to simply the frequency with which regretted decisions
of particular types are reported. Finally, we explore the effects on
regret intensity of different forms of justification; namely, both
explicit justification and implicit justification (i.e., whether the
regrettable decision was consistent with the individual’s implicit
life rules).
The following predictions were tested in relation to
participants’ self-reported greatest lifetime regrets:
(1) According to the temporal theory of regrets, participants
whose greatest lifetime regrets are inactions should report
greater regret intensity.
(2) Also according to the temporal theory of regret, the
action/inaction variable and the length of time since the
regretted decision should have an interactive effect on
regret intensity. Specifically, the longer the time since the
decision, the greater the difference between action and
inaction regrets should be (with inactions resulting in
higher regret intensity).
(3) As per decision-justification theory, regretted decisions for
which the participants reported greater explicit justification
should be associated with lower regret intensity.
(4) As an extension of decision-justification theory, regretted
decisions that were consistent with participants’ personal
life rules (i.e., that had an implicit justification) should
be associated with lower regret intensity. Conversely,
regrets that contradicted participants’ life rules should be
associated with higher regret intensity.
(5) As per the belonging theory of regret, regretted decisions
in social domains should be associated with greater regret
intensity than regrets in non-social domains.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Three thousand individuals were randomly selected from the
New Zealand electoral roll and invited to take part in a postal
survey. The initial participant pool size of 3,000 was chosen
on the basis that this number was considered sufficient to
ensure the return of at least several 100 completed surveys for
analysis.
A total of 677 surveys were returned. Of these, 177 did not
contain responses to any of the items analyzed in this study,
and were excluded from all analyses reported here. A large
part of this apparent missing data was due to a screening
item early in the questionnaire that asked: “Looking back
on your life what level of regret would you say you have?,”
with responses on a 5-item rating scale with endpoints of
“No regrets” and “Many regrets.” The 126 participants who
responded “No regrets” to this item were directed to skip through
to a later portion of the questionnaire, bypassing the items
examined here. These 126 surveys comprised the majority of
the 177 without responses to any of the items analyzed in this
study.
Within the resulting final sample of N = 500, participants
ranged in age from 18 to 87 years, M = 47.3, SD = 15.2. Sixty-
eight percent were female. In terms of ethnicity, the largest groups
were Europeans/New Zealand Europeans (82%) and Ma¯ori (7%).
There was great diversity in education level: 48% of the sample
held only a high school qualification or below, with 24% having
a trade certificate or diploma, and 28% a university degree or
diploma.
Procedure
Once the 3,000 participants had been randomly selected from
the electoral roll, a three-stage postal survey process was used
in order to increase response rates. Based on Dillman’s (2000)
multi-stage tailored design method, the three stages in the current
study consisted of (1) an initial letter of invitation to participate in
a study described as looking “at the development of life regrets,”
(2) a second introduction letter, the postal questionnaire and
free-post return envelope, and (3) a reminder postcard.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Massey University code of ethical
conduct for research, teaching and evaluations involving human
participants with written informed consent from all subjects.
All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the
Massey University Human Ethics Committee.
Measures
Participants were asked to describe (in writing) their greatest life-
time regret using the following specific prompt “Please describe
in the space below the specific event or decision that is the single
greatest regret from your entire lifetime.” They were provided with
seven lines on an A4 page to write their description. Once they
had completed this item, all subsequent questions were asked in
relation to this specified regret. The provided written descriptions
were generally fairly brief, M= 27 words, SD= 26 (excluding one
outlier comprising a multi-page description).
Regret Intensity
In relation to their greatest life-time regret, participants were
asked “How intense are your feelings of regret?” and were required
to circle one number on a 9-point rating scale with five graduated
anchor points (1 “I don’t regret it much,” 3 “I regret it somewhat,”
5 “I regret it quite a bit,” 7 “I regret it a lot,” and 9 “I regret it
immensely”).
Coding Regrets as Actions or Inactions
Participants’ open-ended responses describing their greatest
regrets underwent third-party coding to ascertain whether the
regret involved action or inaction. Two independent coders, blind
to the nature of the research, were asked to code each regret
as reflecting either an action or an inaction. Where the coders
were unable to identify the regret as stemming from an action
or an inaction, they coded the response as indeterminate. These
indeterminate responses were subsequently treated as missing
data in substantive analyses. Interrater reliability was high, with
90% agreement and Cohen’s κ = 0.86, 95% CI [0.82, 0.91],
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suggesting excellent agreement according to the guidelines of
Fleiss et al. (2013).
Coding of Regrets as Social or Non-social
Two further independent coders, also blind to the nature of
the research, separately coded each regret as reflecting 1 of 13
life domains similar to those used by Roese and Summerville
(2005). Regret domains were subsequently collapsed into two
main categories: Social regrets (regrets concerning intimate
relationships, family, parenting, and friendships), and non-
social regrets (regrets concerning education, occupation, finance,
health and self-care, leisure, travel/moves, and the self). Regrets
spanning multiple domains were treated as missing data in the
sense that it was unclear if they were primarily social or non-
social in nature, as were other regrets that could not be classified
within the 13 domains mentioned. Any inter-rater disagreement
during coding was settled by the judgment of the first author.
Interrater reliability was again high, with 83% agreement on the
overarching social/non-social distinction, and Cohen’s κ = 0.91,
95% CI [0.87, 0.95].
Time Since Regret Occurred
Participants were asked to “Please indicate in the space below how
long ago (approximately) this decision or event took place,” with
spaces given to write the number of months and years.
Level of Explicit Justification
To assess whether participants had identified any explicit
justification for their regretted decision they were asked; “At
the time it happened, how justified was the event or decision?”
Response was on a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (“Not
justified”) to 5 (“Completely justified”).
Contradiction of Life Rules (Implicit Justification)
Participants were asked to read the following preface in order
to facilitate consideration of a more implicit (i.e., value-based)
justification for their decision: “Some people have personal rules,
or life philosophies, that often help guide what they do. For
example, some people believe that you should always think of
family needs before your own, or some think that the most
important thing in life is to be nice to people. Take a minute to
think about what some of your most important personal rules are.
What rules help guide your decision-making? Try to choose what
you believe are some of your most important personal rules. Now
that you have them in mind, compare them to the decision or event
that you regret. Do you feel that the decision you made or event you
experienced contradicts any of your personal rules?” In response
to this question, participants could either tick “No it does not” or
“Yes it does.”
Additional Measures
The study reported here formed part of a larger project exploring
the multiple determinants of regret across the lifespan by authors
1, 3, and 5. Additional data collected but not relevant to the
focus of this manuscript included information about participants’
greatest short-term (as opposed to long-term) regrets; the impact
of participants’ regretted decisions; the frequency with which they
thought about their regrets; the extent to which their regrets
prompted each of 15 other emotions; the degree of responsibility
they felt in relation to their regrets; the extent to which they felt
their decisions were justified (in retrospect, as opposed to at the
time); and whether their justifications were based on personal
beliefs or situational factors. Participants also completed the brief
preference for consistency scale (Cialdini et al., 1995).
Data Analysis: Bayesian Approach
Null hypothesis significance testing—the dominant data analysis
framework in psychology—has many well-established problems
(for reviews see Cohen, 1994; Falk and Greenbaum, 1995;
Gigerenzer et al., 2004; Wagenmakers, 2007). In this study we
use Bayesian estimation (see Kruschke, 2010 for an introduction).
Bayesian estimation has three main advantages relevant to
the current study: Firstly, unlike null hypothesis significance
testing—or any frequentist method—it allows us to directly
calculate and report the probability that a particular hypothesis is
true (e.g., the probability that a true parameter is positive, given
the data observed, P(β > 0 | Data) ). Secondly, it also allows us
to directly report the probability that a particular parameter falls
in a specific region (traditional frequentist confidence intervals
cannot do this; see Morey et al., 2015). In this study we
report the 95% highest probability density (HPD) interval for
each parameter. Finally, Bayesian estimation allows us to take
into account prior information: For example, we know that
in psychology, most effects are relatively small in size: Taking
this pre-existing information into account helps us estimate
parameters more accurately.
In this study, we used a similar prior for all estimated effects
(e.g., regression coefficients, mean differences, correlations). This
was a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation
of 0.31, but scaled to apply to the standardized effect size for
each parameter (i.e., the correlation for a bivariate analysis or
partial correlation for a multiple regression analysis). This prior
is based on the finding of a meta-meta-analysis of over 25,000
studies in social psychology (Richard et al., 2003), which reported
a mean absolute effect size of r = 0.21. The prior of N(0, 0.312)
effectively states that there is 50% prior probability that the
standardized effect size will be of absolute magnitude of 0.21 or
greater, corresponding with Richard et al.’s (2003) finding. This
is an informative prior: All else being equal, it will tend to make
our findings more conservative (shrinking our point and interval
estimates slightly toward zero). The basic framework for using
this approach to prior setting is described in Williams (2016).
Non-informative priors were set on nuisance parameters (error
variances and intercepts).
In terms of computation, data analysis was completed in
R version 3.1.1 (R Core Team, 2014) using the MCMCpack
package (Martin et al., 2011). With regard to item missingness,
in addition to the 177 excluded surveys with no responses on the
study variables, there were another 71 surveys with a response
to at least one of the study variables, but with missing data
(or an unclassifiable response) to one or more items. Multiple
imputation (across five datasets) was used to impute the resulting
missing data points in the mice package (Buuren and Groothuis-
Oudshoorn, 2011). Each Bayesian analysis was conducted on
each of the five imputed datasets, with inferential statistics
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(e.g., posterior means, highest posterior density intervals, etc.)
calculated based on the pooled posterior distributions across all
the imputed datasets.
Open Data and Analysis Scripts
Open data and analysis scripts for this study are available at
https://github.com/mattnw/Towers-et-al-Regret.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Despite participants being specifically asked about their greatest
lifetime regrets, there was considerable variation in regret
intensity. The regret intensity ratings traversed the entirety of
the possible scale range (1–9), with a mean of 5.97 (SD = 2.24).
The time elapsed since participants’ greatest regrets also varied
widely, with a mean of 21.77 years (SD = 15.09). The mean of
2.80 for the explicit justification variable (SD = 1.31) was near
the midpoint of 3 (a regretted decision that was “somewhat”
justified). In terms of the dichotomous explanatory variables used
in this study, participants’ regrets were primarily in non-social
(62%) rather than social domains, and the act or decision they
regretted typically contradicted their personal life rules (57%).
Slightly more of the regrets were for inactions (54%) as opposed
to actions.
Bivariate Analyses
The following analyses describe the relationship between each
of the individual explanatory variables in this study and the
response variable (regret intensity). Firstly, the relationships
between regret intensity and the three dichotomous explanatory
variables were assessed. These dichotomous variables were
whether the regret was for an action or for inaction; whether
the life domain of the regret was social or non-social; and
whether the regret contradicted the participant’s personal life
rules. The results are displayed in Table 1. Interestingly, despite
participants being more likely to report inaction regrets as their
greatest lifetime regrets, the intensity of action regrets was higher.
Participants also reported greater regret intensity when the regret
was in a social life domain and when the regret contradicted their
life rules.
Participants who reported higher levels of explicit justification
reported lower regret intensity, r = −0.13, with strong evidence
that the true correlation in the population was negative, 95%
HPD [−0.22, −0.05], P(ρ < 0 | Data) = 0.999. On the other
hand, time since the regret had virtually no relationship with
intensity in the sample, r = 0.01, 95% HPD [−0.08, 0.09], with
the direction of the true relationship remaining unclear, P(ρ > 0
| Data)= 0.564.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The analysis that follows assesses how the relationships between
the explanatory variables and regret intensity change when their
effects are assessed simultaneously. All explanatory variables were
entered simultaneously in this model, the coefficients of which
are shown in Table 2. It is immediately apparent that the effects
of action/inaction and level of explicit justification are attenuated
when the other explanatory variables are controlled for. The
model suggests that when the other predictors are held at zero,
the mean difference in regret intensity between an action and
an inaction is just 0.08 units on the regret intensity scale (this
scale ranging from 1 to 9). As in the bivariate analysis, it was
actions that were associated with higher regret, although there
was a great deal of uncertainty about this conclusion, P(β > 0 |
Data)= 0.604.
The two explanatory variables with the largest effects
were whether or not the regret was in a social domain, and
whether it contradicted the participant’s life rules. On the
other hand, explicit justification level had a small effect:
An increase of one unit on the 1–5 explicit justification
scale was associated with a reduction of just 0.16 units
on the intensity scale, although there was sufficient
evidence that the true parameter was negative, P(β < 0 |
Data)= 0.984.
Importantly, the direction of the estimated coefficient for
the interaction between action/inaction and time was not in
accordance with the predictions of the temporal theory of regret.
The point estimate of the coefficient was positive, suggesting
that the “effect” of a regret being one of action was larger (and
more positive) when more time had elapsed since the regretted
decision. This said, the P(β> 0 | Data) value of 0.901 implies that
while there is relatively high probability that the true direction
of this effect is positive, there does remain some non-trivial
uncertainty.
DISCUSSION
This study was the first to concurrently assess the influence
of multiple regret enhancing mechanisms from the temporal,
decision-justification and belonging theories on the intensity
of experienced life-regret in a sample of adults. In accordance
with the temporal theory of regret (Gilovich and Medvec, 1994,
1995), participants reported greater frequency of lifetime regrets
of inaction rather than action, but our results concerning the
actual intensity of these regrets do not support the predictions
outlined by the temporal theory. Firstly, we found no evidence
to support the assertion of Gilovich and Medvec (1995, p. 381)
that “when people look back on their lives, it seems to be their
regrettable failures to act [inactions] that stand out and cause
greater grief.” Rather, the effect of action/inaction was small, and
it was actions that were associated with greater regret intensity.
Furthermore, in line with previous studies (Feldman et al., 1999;
Bonnefon and Zhang, 2008) we found no evidence to support the
hypothesis that the passing of time leads to an increase in regret
intensity for inactions and a converse reduction in intensity for
actions.
The second theory tested in our study was the decision-
justification theory of regret (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002).
In accordance with this theory, explicit justification level was
negatively related to regret intensity: Participants who felt that
they were more justified in their regretted decisions tended
to report less intense regret. This finding was in accordance
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TABLE 1 | Relationships between dichotomous variables and regret intensity.
Yes No Mean difference
(sample)
95% highest
probability density
(HPD)
Cohen’s d P(δ > 0 | Data)
M SD n M SD n
Action regret 6.27 2.21 228 5.71 2.23 272 0.57 0.16, 0.95 0.25 0.996
Social regret 6.47 2.12 192 5.65 2.26 308 0.81 0.37, 1.23 0.37 >0.999
Regret contradicted life rules 6.41 2.07 285 5.38 2.33 215 1.04 0.63, 1.41 0.47 >0.999
Possible scale range for regret intensity: 1–9. All values (including subsample n sizes) are averaged across five multiply imputed datasets. Means, standard deviations,
mean differences and Cohen’s d statistics reported here are sample statistics; HPD and P(δ > 0 | Data) are based on Bayesian estimation with a prior of N(0, 0.312)
scaled in terms of the standardized r effect size.
TABLE 2 | Multiple regression model with regret intensity as response variable.
Coefficient Un-standardized 95% HPD lower 95% HPD upper Standardized P (β > 0 | Data)
Intercept 5.51 4.78 6.21 >0.999
Regret of action (inaction = 0, action = 1) 0.08 −0.55 0.73 0.02 0.604
Time since regret (years) 0.00 −0.02 0.02 0.01 0.540
Action/inaction∗Time 0.02 −0.01 0.04 0.10 0.901
Level of explicit justification for regret −0.16 −0.31 −0.01 −0.09 0.016
Contradiction of implicit life rules (no = 0, yes = 1) 0.82 0.44 1.22 0.18 >0.999
Social regret (no = 0, yes = 1) 0.62 0.19 1.04 0.13 0.998
Possible scale range for regret intensity: 1–9. All values are averaged across five multiply imputed datasets. All statistics reported here based on Bayesian estimation with
a prior of N(0, 0.312) scaled in terms of the standardized r effect size.
with previous studies showing a negative relationship between
level of justification and regret intensity (Inman and Zeelenberg,
2002; Reb and Connolly, 2010). This said, the relationship
between explicit justification and regret intensity in our study was
small.
On the other hand, participants who reported that their
regretted decision was consistent with their personal life rules
(our operationalization of an implicit justification) reported
less intense regret, with a standardized coefficient about
twice the size of that for explicit justification level (although
this effect was still not very large in size). This finding
suggests a potential modification of decision-justification theory
such that both explicit and implicit justifications might be
theorized to ameliorate regret intensity. Of course, there
could be other ways to operationalize the concept of an
implicit justification in future research. For example, behavioral
measures of implicit attitudes (e.g., Fazio and Olson, 2003)
toward particular types of regretted behaviors could be
used to examine how strongly individuals associate their
regretted behaviors with the concept of “justifiable.” It would
then be possible to test whether participants who implicitly
regard their behavior as justifiable experience less intense
regret.
Finally, the belonging theory of regret (Morrison et al.,
2012) received some support in our study. Congruent with
the predictions by Morrison et al. (2012) regrets experienced
in social domains were more intense than those experienced
in non-social domains (although the effect size was not very
large). This finding supports Morrison et al.’s (2012) theory
that the extent to which a regretted decision constitutes a
threat to an individual’s sense of belonging (e.g., because
it might compromise his or her interpersonal relationships)
has an important influence on the intensity of regret felt.
Morrison’s theory may be valuable in that—to a greater
extent than the temporal and decision-justification theories—
it takes into account how a regretted decision impacts
and relates to an individual’s broader situational and social
context.
This study did have some limitations of scope, most notably
in that we were obviously to unable to test all contemporary
theories of regret. One example of such a theory is the
“opportunity principle” (Roese and Summerville, 2005), which
suggests that people feel the most intense regret in relation
to regretted actions or inactions that they have an ongoing
(but untaken) opportunity to correct. On the other hand, the
“lost opportunity principle” (Beike et al., 2009) suggests that
regret is greatest for lost opportunities: undesirable outcomes
that could have been prevented in the past, but that now
can no longer be remedied. We did not ask our participants
about the capacity that they had to correct their regrets in
the past or at the time of data collection, and could not test
these theories. Furthermore, we did not present analyses of
all of the variables contained within the study questionnaire:
This study reports part of a larger project, with future reports
planned on topics such as the specific type of emotion (e.g., hot,
wistful) felt in relation to regretted decisions. Finally, we did
not examine how individual difference variables might moderate
the effect of the theoretical predictors of regret that we studied.
For example, Feeney et al. (2005) reported that participants
high in self-esteem were more likely to identify a regret of
inaction as their greatest lifetime regret than were participants
low in self-esteem. Feeney et al. (2005) suggested that this
might indicate that experiencing regret for inactions is self-
enhancing.
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The study also had some limitations of design. Although
the sample initially invited to take part was selected randomly
from the population of adult New Zealanders, the modest
response rate means that the sample was not truly random.
Furthermore, the theoretical propositions considered in this
paper relate to causal influences on regret, but the study’s cross-
sectional and correlational design makes it difficult to draw
firm causal conclusions. Finally, the study used only self-report
data, in effect assuming that participants were both willing
and able to provide accurate information about their emotions
and behavior. Of course, all three of these limitations are
common to much research in this area and cannot be easily
circumvented.
CONCLUSION
The current study identified the context of regret (social vs.
not) and the presence of an implicit decision justification as
vital to understanding the intensity of our life regrets. These
findings provides support for the belonging theory of regret
(Morrison et al., 2012), and for a modified version of the decision-
justification theory of regret (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002).
However, the results of this study offer no support to a third
theory (the temporal theory of regret) and strongly suggest that
the commonly held notion that inaction regrets increase and
action regrets decrease in intensity across the lifespan is in fact an
artifact of empirical studies analyzing regret frequency rather than
regret intensity. Future research concerning the nature of regret
intensity requires the development of new theories that consider
the context of regret and the nature of the justification (or lack
thereof) underpinning our regrettable decisions.
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